Organised by
National Judicial Academy, Bhopal
Dates : July 1-3, 2004
Theme : "Controvertial Copyright Issues”
Document prepared by : Mr.Justice R. K. Abichandani, B.A.(Hons),LL.M (Br.I,),LL.M.(Br.IV) Judge, High Court of Gujarat, Sola, Ahmedabad
Theme : “Controversial Copyright Issues”
1. Introduction
1.1 The traditional concept of copyright has given place to a more complex meaning to cope up with the advancements in the nature of works and the mediums of their expressions that merit protection under the Copyright Law. Innumerable issues arise in the process of a virtual tug of war between the copyright holders and their infringers. Stringent remedies are devised to safeguard the intellectual property rights and amendments have been made in the legislation governing IPR in India and Information Technology Act, 2000 has been enacted to be in tune with the international concerns reflected in the WIPO Treaties and other International documents.
1.2 The Copyright Act, 1957 has been enacted by the Parliament in the exercise of its legislative powers conferred by Entry 49 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India with a view to amend and consolidate the law relating copyright. As provided in Section 16, no person shall be entitled to copyright or, any similar right in any work, whether published or unpublished, otherwise than under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Copyright subsists, as per Section 13, in original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works; cinematograph films; and sound recording. “Copyright” means, the exclusive right subject to the provisions of the Act, to do or authorise the doing of any of the acts in respect of a work or any substantial part thereof, as enumerated in Section 14 of the Act, which was substituted by an amendment made with effect from 10-5-1995. The amendments made in the Act reflect the anxiety of the Parliament to cope up with the technological advances made in the mediums in which the works are expressed in different fields. By virtue of the amended definition of the expression “literary work” as contained in section 2(o), it includes computer programmes, tables and compilations including computer databases. The word “computer”as defined in section 2(ffb) includes any electronic or similar device having information processing capabilities; and “computer programme” as defined in Section 2(ffc) means, a set of instructions expressed in words, codes, schemes or in any other form, including a machine readable medium, capable of causing a computer to perform a particular task or achieve a particular result. Rights of broadcasting organization and of performers are dealt with in Chapter VIII which provides in Section 37(1) that, every broadcasting organization shall have a special right to be known as “broadcast reproduction right” in respect of its broadcasts. The word “broadcast” means communication to the public by any means of wireless diffusion, whether in any one or more of the forms of signs, sounds or visual images or by wire and includes a re- broadcast, as defined by Section 2(dd) of the Act. The expression “communication to the public” is defined by Section 2(ff) to mean making any work available for being seen or heard or otherwise enjoyed by the public directly or by any means of display or diffusion other than by issuing copies of such work regardless of whether any member of the public actually sees, hears or otherwise enjoys the work so made available. For this purpose, communication through satellite or cable or any other means of simultaneous communication to more than one household or place of residence including residential rooms of any hotel or hostel shall be deemed to be communication to the public, as per the explanation to this clause. The expression “infringing copy” as defined by Section 2(m) means, in relation to a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, a reproduction thereof otherwise than in the form of a cinematographic film, if made or imported in contravention of the provisions of the Act. It will be noticed that the medium in which such re- production may be made is broadly described as a re- production “otherwise than in the form of a cinematographic films”, which would embrace all other forms in which such work may conceivably be re- produced. In relation to cinematographic film, “infringing copy” means a copy of the film made on any medium by any means; and in relation to a sound recording, any other recording embodying the same sound recording, made by any means, if such copy or sound recording is made or imported in contravention of the provisions of the Act. Section 51 of the Act deals with deemed infringement of copyright. In the explanation, however, it provides that, for the purpose of this section, the reproduction of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work in the form of a cinematograph film shall be deemed to be an “infringing copy”. Section 52 enumerates certain acts which shall not constitute an infringement of copyright and in sub-section 1(a), includes fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work not being a computer programme for the purpose of private use including research, criticism or review, whether of that work or of any other work. Making of copies or adaptation of a computer programme by the lawful possessor of a copy of such computer programme from such copy in order to utilize the computer programme for the purpose for which it was supplied, or to make back-up copies purely as a temporary protection against loss, destruction or damage in order only to utilize the computer programme for the purpose for which it was supplied, do not constitute an infringement of copyright, as provided by section 52(1)(aa).
1.3 The Parliament enacted the Information Technology Act, 2000, (keeping in view the resolution dated 30th January 1997 of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopting the Model Law on Electronic Commerce), which, inter alia, provides legal recognition to electronic record and digital signatures. The expression “electronic record” as defined by Section 2(1)(t) of that Act means, data, record or data generated image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro film or computer generated micro fiche. Tampering with computer source documents is made an offence under Section 65 of the Act, which provides that, whoever knowingly or intentionally conceals, destroys or alters or intentionally or knowingly causes another to conceal, destroy or alter any computer source code used for a computer, computer programme, computer system or computer network, when the computer source code is required to be kept or maintained by law for the time being in force, shall be punishable with imprisonment upto three years, or with fine which may extend upto two lakh rupees, or with both. The expression “computer source code” means the listing of programmes, computer commands, design and layout and programme analysis of computer resource in any form. Whoever commits hacking shall be punished with imprisonment upto three years, or with fine which may extend upto two lakh rupees, or with both, as provided by Section 66(2). “Hacking” is committed by a person who, with the intent to cause or knowing that he is likely to cause wrongful loss or damage to the public or any person, destroys or deletes or alters any information residing in a computer resource or diminishes its value or utility or affects it injuriously by any means, as defined by Section 66(1) of that Act. The Information Technology Act, 2000 provides in Section 79 that, no person providing any service as a network service provider shall be liable under this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder for any third party information or data made available by him if he proves that the offence or contravention was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence or contravention.
2. WCT and WPPT
2.1 The WIPO Copyright Treaty [WCT] {1996} mentions two subject matters to be protected by copyright (i) computer programmes, whatever may be the mode or form of their expression, and (ii) compilations of data or other material (databases), in any form, which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents would constitute intellectual creations. Where a database does not constitute such a creation, it is outside the scope of the said Treaty. As to the rights of authors, the Treaty deals with, the right of distribution, the right of rental and the right of communication to the public and each of them is an exclusive right, subject to certain limitations and exceptions. The Treaty obliges the Contracting Parties to provide legal remedies against the circumvention of technological measures (e.g. encryption) used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights and against the removal or altering of information, such as certain data that identify works or their authors, necessary for the management (e.g. licensing, collecting and distribution of royalties) of their rights (“rights management information”).
2.2 The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT 1996) deals with intellectual property rights of two kinds of beneficiaries : (i) performers (actors, singers, musicians etc.) and (ii) producers of phonograms (the persons or legal entities who or which take the initiative and have the responsibility for the fixation of the sounds). They are dealt with in the same instrument because most of the rights granted by the Treaty to performers are rights connected with their fixed, purely aural performances (which are the subject matter of phonograms). As far as performers are concerned, the Treaty grants performers four kinds of economic rights in their performances fixed in phonograms (not in audiovisual fixations, such as motion pictures) : (i) the right of reproduction, (ii) the right of distribution, (iii) the right of rental, and (iv) the right of making available. The Treaty grants three kinds of economic rights to performers in respect of their unfixed (live) performances : (i) the right of broadcasting (except in the case of rebroadcasting), (ii) the right of communication to the public (except where the performance is a broadcast performance), and (iii) the right of fixation. As far as producers of phonograms are concerned, the Treaty grants them four kinds of economic rights in their phonograms, subject to certain limitations and exceptions; (i) the right of re-production, (ii) the right of distribution, (iii) the right of rental, and (iv) the right of making available. The Treaty obliges the Contracting Parties to provide legal remedies against the circumvention of technological measures (e.g. encryption) used by performers or phonogram producers in connection with the exercise of their rights and against the removal or altering of information, such as, the indication of certain data that identify the performer, the performance, the producer of the phonogram and the phonogram, necessary for the management of the said rights.
3. Fair Dealing
3.1 A fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work [not being a computer programme] for the purposes indicated in Section 52(1)(a), does not constitute an infringement of copyright, as noticed above. Fair use defence allows the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in the copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances.
3.2 The doctrine of fair use has been called the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright. There is no guidance provided for determining whether a particular use is fair and no fixed criteria has emerged from the precedents. Certain factors such as purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used and the effect of use upon the potential market available or value of the copyrighted work, have been listed, but no particular weight is assigned to any of these (See Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, which provides that in determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, these factors should be included in consideration). The findings of fair use would, therefore, depend on the facts of individual case and fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the need in incentive to create and granting creators a complete monopoly which will inhibit the creative ability of others.
3.3 The immediate effect of the copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author’s creative labour. However, the ultimate aim by this incentive is to stimulate an artistic creativity for the general public good. The protection of copyright, however, is not intended to accord a complete control to its owner over all possible uses of his work. The provisions of the Act entitle the copyright holder to have exclusive rights to use and to authorise the use of his work in qualifying ways including reproduction of the copyright work in copies. However, all reproductions of the work are not within the exclusive domain of copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Anyone who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the copyright with respect to such use.
3.4 A question arose before the United States Supreme Court in Sony Corporation v. Universal City Studio Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) as to whether noncommercial home use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves on video tape recorders (VTRs) was a fair use of copyrighted work and did not constitute copyright infringement. In that case, the petitioner Sony Corporation manufactured and sold home video tape recorders (VTRs) and marketed them to retail establishment. The respondents owned the copyright on some of the television programmes that were broadcast on the public airwaves. Some members of the general public used video tape recorders sold by the petitioner to record some of those broadcasts, as well as a large number of other products. The question presented was, whether the sale of petitioner’s equipment to the general public violated any of the rights conferred upon the respondents by the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court held that the protection given to copyrights was wholly statutory and the Court must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a statute. It was held that any individual may reproduce a copyright work for a fair use; the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such use. It was found that there was a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who licensed their works for broadcast on free television would not object to having their broadcast “time-shifted” by private viewers (i.e. “recorded at the time when the VTR owner cannot view the broadcast so that it can be watched at a later time)” , and that, there was no likelihood that, that time-shifting would cause non- minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted works. It was held that the VTRs are capable of substantial non-infringing uses. Private, non-commercial time-shifting in the home satisfies this standard of non-infringing uses both because the respondents had no right to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing such time- shifting for their programmes and because the District Court’s findings revealed that even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents’ programme was legitimate fair use (pp 442 - 456). In the dissenting view, Justice Blackman however opined: “there can be no question that, under the U.S. Act, the making of even single unauthorized copy is prohibited”. In his view: “The making of even a single video tape recording at home falls within this definition; the VTR user produces the material object from which the copyright work can be perceived. Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the making of a single copy for personal use, I must conclude that VTR recording is contrary to the exclusive rights granted by 106(1)”. Distinguishing a fair use by a researcher or a scholar, the learned Judge observed that, there are situations in which strict enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very progress of science and useful arts that copyright is intended to promote and an obvious example is the researcher or scholar whose own work depends on the ability to refer to and to quote the work of prior scholars. But, there is a crucial difference between the scholar and ordinary user. When the ordinary user decides that the owner’s price is too high, and forgoes use of the work, only the individual is the loser. When the scholar forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own work suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to knowledge. The scholar’s work, in other words, produces external benefits from which everyone profits. “In such a case, the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy - albeit at the first author’s expense-to permit the second author to make limited use of the first author’s work for the public good.” The learned Judge held that the making of a video tape recording for home viewing is an ordinary rather than a productive use of the studios copyrighted works, and concluded that : “............ at least when the proposed use is an unproductive one, copyright owner need prove only a potential for harm to the market for or the value of the copyrighted work”. The learned Judge, commenting on the approach of the majority, observed that the Court’s approach dramatically altered the doctrines of fair use and contributory infringement as they had been developed by Congress and the Courts. “As it stands, however, the decision today erodes much of the coherence that these doctrines have struggled to achieve”.
3.5 Although dissemination of creative works is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the artist’s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public’s need for access to creative works. The copyright term is limited so that the public will not be permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist’s labours. The limited monopoly conferred by the Act is intended to motivate creative activity of authors and inventors by recognizing rights in their creative endeavours and to allow the public access to the products of their creative genius after the expiry of the period of their exclusive control. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, a copyright owner has the capacity arbitrarily to refuse to license to one who seeks to exploit the work. [See Fox Film Corporation v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) referred to in Stewart V. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). In the latter case, the Supreme Court held that the unauthorised use of author Cornell Woolrich’s story in the petitioner’s motion picture was not a noninfringing fair use and reiterated that, every unauthorized commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright. Testing on the anvil of the four factors contained in Section 107 of Title 17 U.S.C., it held that all four factors pointed to unfair use - “This case presents a classic example of an unfair use : a commercial use of a fictional story that adversely affects the story owners adaptation rights”.
3.6 The Sony case was distinguished by the District Court of Northern District of Illinois in, In re AIMster copyright litigation, finding that in Sony, the VCRs principal use was non- infringing; while by contrast, AIMster’s primary use was infringement. AIMster provided a file-sharing service over the instant messaging (IM) Network of AOL, ICQ, and YAHOO!. The IM network allowed users to share files with select lists of “buddies”, by providing connections to openly available files and by allowing users to send specific files to one another. AIMster began offering an additional fee-based service that provided lists of popular downloaded songs without any additional requests by the user. The District Court found a likelihood of success on all copyright infringement claims and granted a preliminary injunction against AIMster (later known as Madster), restraining it from allowing any downloading of the recording of the plaintiff recording company’s work. [See Software and Internet Law - Updates, Aspen Law and Business, 2nd Edition, 2003].
3.7 “Fair use” doctrine has an economic dimension. The basic idea is to allow free copying through fair use wherever obstacles to market formation are serious enough to frustrate access by licensing, selling, or other modes of consensual transfer. (See Copyright - By Wendy J. Gordon Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law and Robert G. Bone, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law). The learned Author argues that, if a market does not develop for a creative work or use because high transaction costs impede bargaining, then prohibiting copying makes little sense from an economic perspective. Such a prohibition would prevent socially valuable uses, without providing any monetary return to creators. Recognizing a fair use defence under these circumstances gives copyists and other users access to whatever works happen to be created. “Thus, in the presence of transactional barriers to bargaining, the fair use doctrine serves the important function of facilitating diffusion without significantly chilling creativity.” It is argued that fair use has evolved as an equitable response to market failure, as a way to ensure that socially desirable uses will not be blocked. Considering an example of photocopying by individual scholars, the learned authors reasoned that the transaction costs involved in contacting a copyright owner for permission to photocopy might well outweigh the benefit the scholar expects to reap. In such a case, enforcing the copyright would merely eliminate the photocopying without generating any licence fees for the copyright owner. On the other hand, granting fair use to the scholar would not impair the copyright owners potential income stream and “would allow a socially beneficial use to go forward that transaction costs barrier would otherwise have blocked”. According to these authors, of the many intriguing and unsolved questions remaining to be investigated, perhaps the most important unexamined area is the cost of exclusivity in expression. It is usually assumed that, because copyright does not give exclusivity in ideas, or over useful objects’ utilitarian aspects, its monopolies impose fairly low cost. “As a result, copyright is remarkably easy to obtain and subsists for a relatively long time”.
3.8 Copying for laudable purpose is not necessarily a fair use. Many users - continue to be frustrated by lack of specific, quantitative guidelines to determine whether a use is fair. “But, fair use was designed to be flexible, so that it could evolve with new circumstances and new types of uses. Uncertainty is the price we pay for that flexibility. A Statute that provided greater certainty would inevitably be less responsive to changes in technology and to the myriad ways in which the copyright owners and users exploit their works”. (See Copyright : What Makes A Use “Fair”?, June M. Besek, EDUCAUSE Review, Volume 38, No.6 (November / December 2003) : 12 - 13 ).
3.9 In Luther R. Campbell Akaluke Skywalker, et al. v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., decided on March 7, 1994, 510 U.S. 569 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court held that, parody, like other comment and criticism, might claim fair use. The heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material is the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on the author’s work. However, like other uses, parody has to work its way through the factors relevant for deciding the fair use.
3.10 The fundamental issue to be determined where a defence of fair dealing is raised should be the fairness of the dealing itself. In assessing whether or not there has been a fair dealing with copyright material, it is necessary to form an impression as to the fairness of a dealing, not an impression as to the purpose of the dealing. The notion of fairness is not personal or idiosyncratic, but rather is to be assessed objectively with sound reasons in its support. The formation of an impression as to the fairness of a dealing with copyright material needs to be informed by factors, such as, the amount of copyright material used in the comparison with the length of the copyright material; the extent of use made of such material by the defendant; the motives underlying the use of such material; whether the copyright material is confidential or has not been disclosed to the public; whether parties are in commercial competition with each other in respect of the use of the copyright material in question and the way in which it has been used; whether the use of the material is reasonably appropriate, rather than necessary, for the permitted purpose; and the relevance of, and weight to be given to, any industry practises or agreements between commercial rivals as to what constitutes a fair dealing. (See “A Real Pea Souper” : The Panel Case and the Development of the Fair Dealing Defences to Copyright Infringement in Australia, by Michael Handler (Research Fellow), and David Rolph (Part-time Lecturer), published in Malbourne University Law Review - (2003) MULR 15).
4. Copyrightability of Computer Programme(Customised Programming Language)
4.1 The definition of “Computer Programme” contemplates a set of instructions which are capable of causing a computer to perform a particular task or achieve a particular result. Computer programming is an art of extreme precision; there is no (or extremely little) redundancy in the languages used, leaving no scope for any defect in the source or object code. If a letter or a figure is omitted from the source code, it will most probably not compile (giving an error in the process of attempted compilation) or it may compile with results different from what is intended. Changing any single bit in the object code may be sufficient to render the programme unworkable. Every single element of the source code and object code is thus essential, in that the programme will not perform its intended purpose without that particular element. (See Sydney Law Review, 1998 SydLRev. 12, Article by Ben Kremer : “Copyright and Computer Programmes : Data Access v. Power Flex before the High Court”).
4.2 Data Access Corporation case came to be decided by the High Court of Australia on 30th September 1999 (HCA 49 (30th September 1999). It dealt with the question whether copyright subsisted in an individual command and whether an individual command itself was a computer programme within the meaning of the definition of that expression contained in Section 10(1) of the Copyright Act, 1968 (Cth), of Australia. It was also concerned with the question whether a collocation of those commands constituted a substantial part of the application development system. The Full Court of the Federal Court had held that the copyright as original literary works did not subsist in commands in the Dataflex computer language contained in a computer programme developed by Data Access in the United States. The Full Court held that those commands were not “computer programmes” and were not entitled to the protection of the Copyright Act, 1968 (Cth). An amendment, similar to the one made in Section 2(o) of the Copyright Act, 1957 in India, by which literary works included computer programmes, tables and compilations, including computer database, was also made in Section 10(1) of the Australian Act, in which, as per item (b), the words “A computer programme or a compilation of computer programmes” were added in the definition of “literary works”. The High Court of Australia held that the said amendment “obviously marked a significant departure from what previously had been the understanding of what was required for subsistence of copyright in an original literary work”. The Court observed that, in construing the expression “set of instructions” in the definition of “computer programme”, there is no need to choose between the technical meaning and the natural and ordinary meaning of the expression. Words in a statutory definition are to be interpreted in their statutory context. The Court cannot interpret the meaning of the definition of “computer programme” without some understanding of the manner in which a computer executes a computer programme. If interpreting a phrase “set of instructions” in the definition of “computer programme” in light of the manner in which a computer operates is to be regarded as ascribing a technical meaning to the phrase, then it must be given its technical meaning. However, the “natural and ordinary” meaning and the “technical or art” meaning of the phrase “set of instructions” is one and the same when it is considered in its statutory context, (paragraph 34).
4.3 In this case, Data Access owned the copyright in a system of computer programme which was known as Dataflex. The Dataflex system incorporated: a programme development system which provided the means to write, edit, compile and run programmes under development; a computer programming language known as the “Dataflex language” which was an application development language in which the source code for all Dataflex programmes was written or generated; a compiler programme which translated the dataflex source code programmes written in the Dataflex language by using the programmes development system, into an internal format, which was then able to be run by the runtime programme; and a runtime programme, which was executable programme required to run the compiled application programmes, developed using the programming development system. It was contended by Data Access Corporation that copyright subsisted in each of the Reserved Words because each was a “computer programme” and that copyright also subsisted in the collocation of Reserved Words comprising the Dataflex language because this collocation was a “computer programme”. The Court found that each of the Reserved Words was a single word; none a “set of instructions” in the Dataflex language. Further, none of the Reserved Words intended to express, directly or indirectly an algorithmic or logical relationship between the function desired to be performed and the physical capabilities of the “device having digital information processing capabilities”. It was held that the Reserve Words themselves are not a “computer programme” in Dataflex language, and that each Reserved Word “comprises but a single instruction in that language”. Each Reserved Word considered alone, is not a “set of instructions” in that language. It was further held that although Reserved Words together form “an expression ... of a set of instructions”, their simple listing together, without more, does not cause a computer to perform any identifiable function. There is no interrelationship of the instructions with one another which is an expression of a logical or algorithmic relationship between an identifiable function and the physical capabilities of the computer via the medium of the Dataflex language. Dealing with the contention that the appellant’s copyright was infringed because collocation of Reserved Words was a substantial part of the Dataflex system, the Court held that, in determining whether something is a reproduction of a substantial part of a computer programme, the essential or material features of the computer programme should be ascertained by considering the originality of the part allegedly taken. The Court held that even when the Reserved Words were considered as a collocation, they did not possess sufficient originality as data to constitute a substantial part of the computer programme of Dataflex system.
4.4 Whether a part copied is substantial or not must depend on its quality rather than its quantity. The reproduction of a part which by itself has no originality will not normally be a substantial part of the copyright and therefore will not be protected. For that which would not attract copyright except by reason of its collocation will, when robbed of that collocation, not be a substantial part of the copyright and therefore the courts will not hold its reproduction to be an infringement. Thus, “there will be no copyright in some unoriginal part of a whole that is copyright”. [See Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] All E.R. 465, 481].
4.5 A computer consists of two principal components: hardware and software. The hardware comprises the physical machinery of the computer and is usually made up of four components: an input device (such as a typewriter-like keyboard); a control processing unit (CPU) which converts raw data into useful information; a memory or data storage device, and output devices which include disks, printers or video display terminals. While in operation, these components interact on the instruction of a microprocessor which, in turn, receives its direction or command from a computer programme. In general, a computer will only function if the programme is loaded into the computer’s RAM (one of the data storage devices which temporarily stores data that is currently being processed by the computer). The information in the RAM is in the form of evanescent electrical impulses. It is stored in the form of a charge on a capacitor. Information in RAM can be changed simply by downloading new information. The information will be erased if the computer is turned off. When the computer is turned off, the capacitor begins to discharge both as a result of its own leakage resistance and the fact that it continues to conduct a tiny amount of current. Each time a computer is turned on, a programme or a portion of the programme, is “loaded” onto the computer’s RAM. Thus, for a computer to operate it must take information from a programme (which will take the form of permanent storage, such as a CD-ROM), translate that information and store it in the RAM from where it will be transferred to the CPU which will perform the actions called for by the programme and send the appropriate directions to other parts of the system. The question that arises is, whether downloading a computer programme (or, more accurately, the object code) into a console’s RAM amounts to a reproduction of the object code and thus infringes the copyright contained in the computer programme. This question directly arose in Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v. Eddy Stevens before the Federal Court of Australia Full Court, decided on 30th July 2003, [(2003) FCAFC 157]. It was held by the majority that, according to ordinary English usage, the electronic impulses in RAM do not constitute “material form”. The Court approved the view that the transient holding and displacement of data in RAM which necessarily occurs in the course of the running of a computer programme as not constituting “storage” within the definition of “material form”. The Court was, however, of the unanimous opinion that the broader construction of the definition of the expression “technological protection measure” was to be preferred and the appeals brought by Sony Company were allowed by holding that, by supplying and installing the modified chips in Playstation consoles so that the unlawfully copied games could be played on them without the non-re-producible access codes that are normally the means by which a device in the console, known as a Boot ROM recognises lawful copies, the respondent was liable under Section 116A of the Copyright Act, 1968(Cth) to the three Sony Companies. Section 116A confers upon copyright owners a right of action against the persons supplying devices to circumvent technological protection measures which are designed to prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright by the use of access codes or copy control mechanisms.
4.6 Justice Lindgren was of the opinion that the notion of embodiment (under Section 10(1) of the Australian Act “copy” in relation to a cinematograph film, means any article or thing in which the visual images or sounds comprising the film are embodied, (compare with Section 2(m)(ii) of the Indian Act which uses the expression “copy of the film made on any medium”), was not satisfied by what occurred in the Console’s RAM, referring to the reason stated by the Court below that the evidence suggested that only a very small proportion of the images and sounds comprising the cinematography film are embodied in the playstation console’s RAM at any given time. According to him, “such article or thing can be taken in one’s hand and used from time to time, with the use of some other device, to reproduce the visual images in question”. (See paragraphs 182 and 183 of the judgment). Justice Finkelstein , while agreeing that the appeal should succeed on the first ground, differed on the remaining two grounds including the question as to whether downloading a computer programme into a Console’s RAM amounts to re-production of the object code and thus infringes the copyright contained in the computer programme. The learned Judge observed that “Whatever Computer Experts may say”, RAM was a method of storage as per the Explanatory Memorandum. In his view, if there is no longer a requirement for an allegedly infringing work to be continuously visible, there is no reason why storage in RAM cannot be a relevant form of storage. The Legislation should also be construed in a way that accommodates scientific changes. In particular, the meaning to be given to “form ......... of storage” must keep abreast with the digital age. Furthermore, transitory nature of the memory in RAM is more complex than it first appears. On the one hand, the information that is stored can be wiped out in a second. On the other, it is possible that it may remain stored in RAM for the life of the computer. To hold that RAM is not a form of storage, would be to thwart the Legislature’s intention, according to the learned Judge. (See paragraph 208). The learned Judge was of the opinion that the phrase “an article or thing” should be subject to an interpretation that is broad or as some might say, “open - textured”. On this approach, RAM which is a device for storage may be regarded “as a thing”. It is no less a “thing” than some other “thing” which exists as a separate or distinct entity with its own individual qualities such as a piece of equipment or as something which may in a sense be possessed or owned. It was not in dispute that sounds and images which are stored in RAM were capable of being re-produced. (See paragraph 215 of the dissenting judgement by Finkelstein J. in Kabushiki Kaisha (supra).
4.7 Section 10(1) of the Australian Act defines “technological protection measure” to mean “a device or product or a component incorporated into a process, that is designed, in the ordinary course of its operation, to prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a work or other subject matter by either or both of the following means : (a) by ensuring that access to the work or other subject matter is available solely by use of an access code or process (including decryption, unscrambling or other transformation of the work or other subject matter) with the authority of the owner or licensee of the copyright; (b) through a copy control mechanism”. A circumvention device is a device (including a computer programme) having only a limited commercial significant purpose or use, or no such purpose or use other than the circumvention or facilitating circumvention of an effective technological protection measure.
4.8 It will be noticed that, under Article 11 of the WCT, it is provided that contracting parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under the said Treaty or the Berne Convention, and that restrict acts in respect of their works, which are not authorised by the authors concerned or permitted by law. Article 18 of the WPPT provided similarly in relation to performers and producers of sound recordings. The reforms on the above lines for updating India’s copyright standards to meet the challenges of communication technology in particular the huge expansion of the internet, are overdue in order to maintain the delicate balance between the rights of copyright owners and the rights of copyright users. The use of technological protection measures by copyright owners is likely to increase in the near future as system for the on- line trading of copyright material is adopted in India.
4.9 The technological measures to protect copyright materials are essentially of two types : access control measures and copy control measures. Access control measures allow the copyright owner to control who has access to the copyrighted material. Examples of access control measures include password protection, file permission and encryption. Copy control measures allow the copyright owner to control the extent of a person’s access to copyright material. Copy control measures are based on the premise that a user already has some lawful access to the work and the measures seek to control what the user can then do with the lawfully obtained copyrighted material. An example of a copy control mechanism is a mechanism that allows first generation copies but prevents second and subsequent generation copies. There is a difference in scope between the two types of measures (access control measures and copy control measures). Copy control measures are more closely allied with copyright, and with the infringement of copyright, than access control measures. Access control measures seek to prevent all access to copyright material, not only that access which is unlawful. (See The House of Representative Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (The HRSCLCA) Committee, Australia, in its Advisory Report referred in paragraph 117 of the judgement of Lindgren J. in Kabushiki Kaisha (supra).
4.10 The Copyright Act should not be given a meaning that is frozen in time, but should be interpreted in a way that takes into account technological advances, provided that the interpretation is consistent with its purpose. The unauthorized circumvention of locking device should be specifically made actionable at the instance of copyright owners and their exclusive licensees and the use of any device which enables the unauthorized use of computer programme should be prohibited. The Copyright Act, 1957 is, therefore, required to be amended to provide that copyright owners and their exclusive licensees may have the right to prevent the commercial manufacture, storage, distribution and possession, for commercial purposes, of devices which are designed to facilitate the unauthorized circumvention of locks or other devices applied to protect computer programmes from unauthorized copying.
5. Music on-Hold
5.1 The question as to whether a service centre had infringed the right to broadcast the work (the broadcast right) when mobile callers were played music-on-hold and whether it had infringed the right to cause the work to be transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion service (diffusion right) when conventional callers were played music on hold, arose before the High Court of Australia in Telstra Corporation Ltd. v. Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd. (1997) 146 ALR 649. Telstra was a test case brought by APRA against Telstra concerning Telstra’s copyright liability for providing music on hold. All members of the court found that Telstra had infringed the broadcast right when mobile callers received music on hold.
5.2 The evidence revealed that Telstra participated in the provision of music on hold in three different ways. The first was where a person made a telephone call to a Telstra Service Centre and heard music played by a machine at the centre when he was placed on hold. The second situation involved a person who heard music onhold after calling various business and governmental organizations to which Telstra provided a transmission facility for that purpose. The third situation involved a person hearing music on hold after making a telephone call to a subscriber to a service known as CustomNet which was provided by Telstra. Where the telephone line of a subscriber to CustomNet was busy, the electromagnetic current carrying the call was diverted to a music-on- hold facility situated at Telstra’s nearest telephone exchange. In any of these three situations, the music on hold could be prerecorded and played from a compact disc or tape recording or from music broadcast from a radio station which transmitted to the general public.
5.3 Each of the three situations outlined above could occur in one of two ways. First, where the caller used conventional telephone; the second where the caller used a mobile telephone. The Court held that, in each of the situations in which Telstra participated in provision of music on hold to callers using the conventional telephones, it was the operator of diffusion services and the works were transmitted to such subscribers to a diffusion service. Mobile telephones have a radio transmitter and a radio receiver by which communication is made to a nearby station. Through the base station, radio transmission through and from the mobile telephone were connected to the rest of the telephone net work. When a caller from a mobile telephone hears music on hold, he has received a transmission, otherwise then over a path provided by a material substance, of electromagnetic energy, that is to say, by wireless telegraphy. The moot question was whether a transmission in question can be said to be “to the public”.
5.4 Construing the meaning of the expression “to the public” in the definition of “broadcast”, a view was expressed that the legislative history of the definition of broadcast indicated that the words “to the public” was supposed to incorporate the notion of copyright owner’s public. The copyright owner’s public refers to “group” which the copyright owner would otherwise contemplate as its public for the purpose of its work. Kirby J. identified three broad principles from the cases on performances in public that were relevant to elucidating the meaning of the expression “to the public”. The first principle was that a performance was “in public” if it was not “in private”. The second principle arose from the need to make the distinction between “public” and “private” and it involved asking, what is the nature of the audience? A significant indicator of the nature of the audience was the commercial nature of the activity occurring. The third and the most important, principle is that, the public is the copyright owner’s public. (at pages 690-692). The majority found Telstra to be “distributing” the music, even though it was received by individuals through their individual telephone connections and might only be heard by one caller at any one time. This was because there was a common source from which the music was conveyed over wires to the various callers. McHugh J. disagreed with this conclusion by arguing that music on hold was not broadcast or other matter. He concluded that the music sent over the telephone wire was not broadcast because it had not first been transmitted to the public by wireless telegraphy. (at page 665). The decision in Telstra has been commented upon on the ground that it did not pay any attention to the meaning of “transmitting” in the definition of “broadcast”. (See Article by Tanya Aplin IMAGO, Sr. Research Fellow in Multimedia Law, Murdoch University, Electronic Journal of Law, Volume 4, No.3 (September 1997).
6. Television Broadcasting
6.1 Interest sought to be protected by the conferral of the television broadcast copyright was identified by Spicer Committee with reference to the experience of the B.B.C. and the Independent Television Authority. The latter was established by the Television Act 1954 (U.K.) and charged by section 3 to “broadcast ..... programmes” of a certain standard. [Notice similar provisions in Prasar Bharti Act, 1990). This interest was identified as that in the cost and skill in assembling or preparing and transmitting programmes to the public. That activity of public broadcasting occurred in exercise of statutory authority which required the transmission of programmes of a certain standard or quality identified by their content. The Spicer Committee decided against leaving it to the broadcasters to record or film their broadcasts and so depend upon the protection given to sound recordings and cinematography films. (See para 70 of the judgement in Network Ten Pty. Ltd. v. TCN Channel Nine Pty. Ltd. (2004) HCA 14, decided on 11th March 2004).
6.2 In Network Ten Pty. Ltd. (supra), the litigation concerned alleged infringement, by NetworkTen, of the Copyright of TCN channel Nine in certain television products. The Ten Network broadcast a weekly television programme entitled The Panel which included 20 extracts from the programmes previously broadcast by the Nine Network. These were used in 15 different episodes of The Panel broadcast in 1999 - 2000. Before that use, each extract was placed on an individual video tape. The ‘Panel Segments’ ranged in duration from 8 to 42 seconds and were taken from programmes of the usual advertised, length of 30 minutes to one hour. Injunctive relief sought by the Channel Nine was to restrain the re- broadcasting “on the television programme (The Panel) ..... of a substantial parts of any television broadcast by Nine without its consent.” Nine also claimed a declaration of infringement of the “broadcast copyright” of Nine in each of the episodes of what were identified as the television Programmes known as for example, “The Today show, A Current Affair, Australia’s Most Wanted”. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia had granted declaratory relief and remitted the matter to the Primary Judge, any question of further reliefs consequential upon the declaratory relief. At trial, Conti J. held that Ten had not taken the whole or substantial part of any of Nine’s broadcasts. Those findings were reversed in the Full Court. Before the High Court, Nine sought to uphold the Full Court’s decision in its favour that each visual image capable of being observed as a separate image on a television screen and accompanying sounds is “a television broadcast” in which copyright subsists. The gist of Ten’s complaint was that the term “a television broadcast” as it appeared in the Act, was misread by the Full Court, with the result that the content of that expression was so reduced that questions of substantiality would have no practical operation and the ambit of the copyright monopoly was expanded beyond the interests the legislation sought to protect. The High Court accepted the Ten’s submission and allowed the appeal. In the process, the Court agreed with the opinion of Conti J. that television advertisements should be treated as discreet television broadcasts, particularly since “a television or cinema commercial is typically the product of the creative and administrative work of many separate individuals.......”. The Court held that the circumstance that a prime time news broadcast included various segments, items or “stories” does not necessarily render each of these “a television broadcast” in which copyright subsisted under the Act.
6.3 Callinan J. agreed with the view of the Federal Court that recording and broadcasting, not by way of fair dealing, by one telecaster or excerpts from the broadcasts of a commercial competing telecaster were infringements by the former of the latter’s copyright, and opined in paragraph 143 of the judgement that the use by the appellant of excerpts from the respondents broadcast was blatant, and that, this was a case of blatant commercial exploitation, neither more nor less. The Judge observed : “The test cannot be simply whether the images and sounds captured and fixated last a millisecond or half an hour. In aggregate they still constituted a broadcast”.
7. Protection of Folklore - Aa Emerging Issue
7.1 The technological advances have facilitated the commercial exploitation of works of art, craft and knowledge of traditional society on a scale that is unprecedented. There is evidence of indigenous music and dance being sampled by record companies and performance groups, which are presented to the public as original compositions or choreography. Babacar Ndoye, a Former Director of the Copyright Office of Senegal, cites an example of an African Folklore Group’s European Performance by a composer who arranged and registered the recording as his original work. The work was a phenomenal success, but all profits went to the composer without any compensation to the community from which the folklore originated. There is, therefore, necessity for stringent protection of expressions of folklore in light of current technological capabilities. (See Article by Paul Kuruk, Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University, Birmingham, Alabama - “Protecting Folklore under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes - A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States”). The author suggested in his conclusion the creation of a regional agency with authority to institute infringement actions abroad and to serve as the conduit for processing requests to use folklore as well as distributing compensation collected for the use of folklore.
7.2 The need for intellectual property protection of expression of folklore has been internationally recognized. Folklore is an important element of the cultural heritage of every nation. It is, however, of particular importance for developing countries, which recognize folklore as a means of self- expression and social identity. Folklore is commercialized without due respect for the cultural and economic interests of the communities in which it originates.
7.3 “Folklore” is traditional cultural heritage passed on from generation to generation in contrast with the individual, personal nature of the creativity represented by literary and artistic works proper. By its very nature, the expression of folklore is the result of creative contributions of usually unknown members of a number of subsequent generations and this is why its protection could not be reasonably limited in time. In case of majority of laws providing for the protection of folklore creations, it can be deduced from the context of their provisions that such protection is perpetual, but the laws of some countries (Congo, Ghana and Sri Lanka) also state this explicitly. (See WIPO Document on “Intellectual Property Protection of Expressions of Folklore : Attempts at the International Level”: www.wipo.org/ academy/ en/publications/ coll_of_documents_on_lp/).
7.4 Traditional creations of a community, such as, folk tales, folk songs, folk music, folk dances, folk designs or patterns, may often not fit into the notion of literary and artistic works. Copyright is author-centric and, in the case of folklore, an author - at least in the way in which the notion of “author” is conceived in the field of copyright - is absent. The existing system of copyright protection being inadequate for the protection of folklore, possibilities of a sui generis solution were explored.
7.5 The WIPO and UNESCO convened a working group in Geneva in 1980, then a second one in Paris in 1981, to study the Draft Model Provisions intended for national legislation prepared by WIPO, as well as possible international measures for the protection of works of folklore, and, the outcome of those meetings was submitted to a Committee of Governmental Experts convened by WIPO and UNESCO, at WIPO Head Quarters in Geneva in 1982, which adopted “Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions”. (Model Provisions).
7.6 The “expressions of folklore”, as defined in Section 2 of the Model Provisions, are understood as productions consisting of characteristic elements of the traditional artistic heritage developed and maintained by a community in the country or by individuals reflecting the traditional artistic expectations of such a community. Model Provisions were adopted with the intention of paving the way for regional and international protection, since many countries considered it of paramount importance to protect expressions of folklore also beyond the frontiers of the countries in which they originate. There are two main categories of acts against which, under the Model Provisions, expressions of folklore are protected, namely, illicit exploitation and other prejudicial actions. Illicit exploitation of an expression of folklore is understood in the Model Provisions (section 3) as any utilization made both with gainful intent and outside the traditional or customary context of folklore, without authorization by a competent authority or the community concerned. “Other prejudicial actions” detrimental to interests related to the use of expressions of folklore are identified by the Model Provisions, as four cases of offenses subject to penal sanction (section 6). The Model Provisions provided for the protection of the “appellation of origin” of expressions of folklore and Section 5 requires that, in all printed publications, and in connection with any communication to the public, of any identifiable expression of folklore, its source be indicated in an appropriate manner by mentioning the community and/or geographic place from where the expression utilized has been derived. Any unauthorised utilization of an expression of folklore where authorization is required, constitutes an offence. It is understood that such an offence may also be committed by using expression of folklore beyond the limits, or contrary to the conditions of an authorization obtained. Misleading the public by creating the impressions that what is involved is an expression of folklore derived from a given community when, in fact, such is not the case, is also punishable. This is essentially a form of “passing off”. Finally, it is an offence if, in the case of public uses, expressions of folklore are distorted in any direct or indirect manner “prejudicial to the cultural interests of the community concerned”. The term “distorting” covers any act of distortion or mutilation or other derogatory action in relation to the expression of folklore. (See paragraphs 39 to 42 of the WIPO document ibid).
7.7 There are various categories of expressions of folklore that are possible subjects of a copyright - type - but sui generis - protection. Some of them, such as, folk arts in drawings, paintings, carvings, sculptures, pottery etc. obviously cannot enjoy indirect protection by means of “neighboring rights” or “related rights”. However, in the case of many other important categories of expressions of folklore, “related rights” may be used as a fairly efficient means of indirection protection. Folk tales, folk poetry, folk songs, instrumental folk music, folk dances, folk plays and similar expressions actually live in the form of regular performances. If the protection of performers is extended to the performance of such expressions of folklore, the performances of such expressions of folklore also enjoy the statutory protection. The same can be said about the protection of the rights of producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations in respect of their phonograms and broadcasts, respectively, embodying such performances.
7.8 The United Nations Educational Scientific & Cultural Organization has made “Recommendations on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore”, adopted on 15th November 1989 by the General Conference, at its 25th Session held in Paris. It recommends that folklore as a form of cultural expression, must be safeguarded by and for the group (familial, occupational, national, regional, religious, ethnic etc.) whose identity it expresses. The member States should encourage, for this purpose, appropriate survey research on national, regional and international levels for collecting the data as regards the institutions concerned with folklore and other material.
7.9 In so far as folklore constitutes manifestations of intellectual creativity whether it be individual or collective, the Recommendation states that, it deserves to be protected in the manner inspired by the protection provided for intellectual productions. Such protection of folklore has become indispensable as a means of promoting further development, maintenance and dissemination of those expressions, both within and outside the country, without prejudice to related legitimate interests. It is emphasized that the need for separate action in a range of areas to safeguard folklore is urgent, and recommended that the Member States should, regarding the “other rights” involved: protect the informant as the transmitter of tradition (protection of privacy and confidentiality); protect the interest of the collector by ensuring that the materials gathered are conserved in archives in good condition and in a methodical manner, adopt the necessary measures to safeguard the materials gathered against misuse, whether intentional or otherwise, and recognize the responsibility of archives to monitor the use made of the materials gathered.
7.9
7.10 The existing IPR Regimes are inadequate to address all of the issues involved in protection of traditional knowledge and folklore. The leading role played WIPO and UNESCO in offering a set of Model Provisions for the purpose of protecting the expressions of folklore, gives a useful guidance for framing the relevant national laws or making suitable amendments therein to ensure protection of expressions of folklore in the category of intellectual property rights.
8. Combating Piracy
8.1 The internet while changing the way our society communicates has also changed the nature of many crimes including theft of intellectual property. Trafficking in infringing copyrighted works through increasingly sophisticated electronic means, including peer-to-peer file trading networks, Internet chat rooms and news groups, has posed alarming problems. It is recorded in the U.S. that the most popular peer-to- peer file trading software programmes have been downloaded by computer users over 200,000,000 times; that at any one time, there are over 3,000,000 users simultaneously using just one of these services. Each month, on an average, over 2,300,000,000 digital media files are transferred among users of peer-to- peer systems. Many computer users simply believe that they will not be caught or prosecuted for their conduct. (See Section 2 Findings - Piracy Deterrence & Education Act of 2004, (Bill Introduced in the House of Representatives - H.R. 4077). Under this Act, the Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Register of Copyrights shall develop a programme based on providing of information and notice to deter members of the public from committing acts of copyright infringement through the internet, and facilitate the sharing, among law enforcement agencies, Internet service providers and copyright owners, of information concerning acts of copyright infringement. Such programme shall include issuing appropriate warnings to individuals engaged in acts of copyright infringement that may be subject to criminal prosecution. (Section 3 of the Bill H.R. 4077 108th Congress Second Session - March 31, 2004).
8.2 The U.S. Attorney General is enjoined with a duty (section 4) for designation and training of agents in computer hacking and intellectual property units. The Attorney General has to ensure that any unit in the Department of Justice responsible for investigating computer hacking or responsible for investigating intellectual property crimes is assigned atleast one agent to support such unit for the purpose of investigating crimes relating to the theft of intellectual property.
8.3 Section 5 of the proposed legislation provides for the establishment of Internet Use Education Programme, with a view to educate the general public concerning the value of copyrighted works and the effects of the theft of such works on those who create them, and also educate the general public concerning the privacy, security and other risks of using the Internet to obtain illegal copies of copyrighted works. The Internet Use Educational Programme shall develop materials appropriate to Internet users in different sectors of the general public where criminal copyright infringement was a concern. Unauthorized recording of motion pictures in a motion picture theater was to be an offence made punishable by imprisonment for not more than three years and fine or both, and for the second or subsequent offence, imprisonment upto six years could be imposed. (See section 8 - Prevention of Surreptitious Recording in Motion Pictures Act). All these provisions of the Bill can provide useful guidelines for introducing similar changes in the Indian Copyright law by making suitable adaptation in its context.
9. Internet Service Providers
9.1 Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 declares, for the removal of doubts, that no person providing any service as a network service provider shall be liable under this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder for any third party information or data made available by him if he proves that the offence or contravention was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence or contravention. The expression “network service provider” means an intermediary, for the purpose of this Act, and the expression “third party information” means any information dealt with by a network service provider in his capacity as an intermediary, as per the Explanation. This Act has an overriding effect over other laws by virtue of Section 81.
9.2 The problem facing Internet Service Providers (“ISPs) and other interactive computer service providers was how they could protect themselves from liability that might arise based on information that was posted by third parties without any direct involvement by the service provider. The service providers voiced concern that, given the millions of users and the enormous volume of communication passing through their computer systems, it was impossible for them to responsibly control all communications, or investigate and act on complaints.
9.3 In the United States, a new Section 512 was added to U.S. Copyright Statute, by Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which was intended to give service providers greater certainty regarding copyright infringement risk by creating a safe harbor from liability. A service provider must satisfy pre-conditions to take advantage of the exemption provided by Section 512(c), which created an exemption from copyright liability “by reason of storage at the direction of the user of material that resides on a system or network control or operated by or for the service provider ......”. First, the provider must lack knowledge that it is hosting infringing material. The provider must lack “actual knowledge” that the material is infringing, it must not be aware of “facts and circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent”. Once they became apparent, it must act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the material. The service provider must satisfy that he cannot receive a “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” where the provider “has the right and ability to control such activity”. The service provider must respond expeditiously to remove or disable access to the material (Section 512(c)(1)(C)), which is referred to as a “notice and take down” procedure. (See Paper by Lee T. Gesmer :“Using the CDA and DMCA To Limit Liability For Publication Torts And Copyright Infringement”, first presented at Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education’s 2001 Internet And E- Commerce Conference, held in Boston, on December 6, 2001).
10. Sovereign Immunity
10.1 In three cases [Alden v. Maine (Labour case), College Savings Bank v. Florida (Trademark case), and Florida v. College Savings Bank (Patent case)], all decided by identical 5 to 4 majority, the U.S. Supreme Court on June 23, 1999, made States immune from suits by state employees for violations of Federal labour law; by patent owners for infringement of their patents by state universities and agencies; and by people bringing unfair - competition suits over States’ activities in the marketplace. “When the Court’s work was over, two federal laws had been declared unconstitutional, one 35 year old precedent was explicitly overturned and one 15 year precedent was effectively dead”. [See a write up by Linda Green House in the New York Times on the Web, June 24, 1999].
10.2 In the early 90’s, the Federal Courts had begun to dismiss patent and trademark suits which were brought against the State agencies on the ground that Congress had not met the Supreme Court’s standards for explicitly abrogating the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits of this type. In response, Congress passed two laws in 1992, the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act and Patent Remedy Clarification Act, explicitly permitting these kinds of suits against States in the Federal Court.
10.3 After the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act amended the patent laws to expressly abrogate the States sovereign immunity, the respondent College Savings Bank [Florida Pre-paid Post Secondary Education Board v. College Savings Bank – 527 U.S. 627 (1999)] filed a Patent Infringement Suit against the petitioner Florida Pre-paid Photo Secondary Education Expenses Board, a Florida State entity. The Florida Pre-paid claimed that the Act was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to use its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity.College Savings countered that Congress had properly exercised its powers pursuant to Article 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to enforce due process guarantees under Article 1 of the Amendment. The Untied States intervened to defend the statute’s constitutionality. The Supreme Court held that the Act’s abrogation of States’ sovereign immunity is invalid because it cannot be sustained as legislation enacted to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Patent Remedy Act was enacted to “clarify that States, instrumentalities of States and officers and employees of the States acting in their official capacity, are subject to suit in Federal Court by any person for infringement of patents and plant variety protections”.
10.4 The Court, by its 5-4 majority opinion held that the provisions of the Patent Remedy Act were “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that they cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior........ An unlimited range of State conduct would expose a State to claims of direct, induced, or contributory patent infringement”. The minority opinion put up a strong dissent expressing the view that the Act should be upheld even if full respect is given to the Court’s recent cases cloaking the States with increasing protection from congressional legislation.
10.5 The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an ancient legal principle, dating back to feudal Europe, when power flowed from the King down through nobility and very little trickled down to the peasantry. It is rooted in the premise that to submit to the jurisdiction of a court implies that one is subservient or inferior to the power of that Court. Such a doctrine cannot have any place in the modern democratic era and to the extent that the decision upheld the defence of State immunity, it has made it difficult to comprehend the resultant denial of remedies in respect of infringements made by the State entities.
10.6 The decision in Florida Prepaid has generated a firestorm of critism, and some argue that this result is indefensible as a matter of constitutional text, original meaning, and precedent; but as importantly, they say, it is practically unsound and unjustifiable - the transparent folly of the result shows that the Court must have erred in its reasoning. (See 145 Congress Record S 10359 (daily ed. August 5, 1999), statement of Senator Specter, referred to in an Article by Eugene Volokh, Professor of Law, UCLA Law School : “Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property”, originally published at 73, Southern California Law Review 1161 (2000)). The learned author, however, concluded that Florida Prepaid results are far from practically senseless or morally repugnant. They do run against one intuitively appealing theory (state infringers should be treated like individual infringers) but they are actually more consistent than the Pre-Florida Pre-paid regime with two other theories (state infringers should be treated like federal infringers and intellectual property should be treated like tangible property). Barring such support, recognition of doctrine of sovereign immunity can disturb the balance sought to be achieved by “national treatment” clauses by which the copyrights are attempted to be universally protected, for, there can be States which do not recognize any such doctrine in the context of suits filed for infringement of copyrights against their State entities.
10.7 Justice Souter in Alden v. Maine, involving enforcement of Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938, observed that, there was almost no evidence that the generation of the Framers thought sovereign immunity was fundamental in the sense of being unalterable. He noted that, in Great Britain, the King himself is sued and he never fails to comply with the judgement of his Court.
10.8 It has been observed that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Florida Pre- paid v. College Savings was likely to have a significant negative effect on copyright owners’ ability to bring copyright infringement suits against States and their instrumentalities. Without the right to sue a State or State instrumentality for copyright (or Patent or Trademark) infringement in Federal Court, States and State officials are free to engage in widespread uncontrolled copying and use of the valuable intellectual property assets of others without fear of being held liable for infringement. “This is a significant problem for copyright owners who are likely to suffer tremendous losses due to increased infringement by States as a result of this decision”. (See “State Sovereign Immunity Exercise”, By David G. Savage, Time Staff Writer, POSC 140).
10.9 The United States Senator Maria Cantwell in the statement before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary which met on February 27, 2002, voiced a broader concern that the Supreme Court decisions “driving our need to legislate in this area reflect an extremely disconcerting shift in the Supreme Court’s perspective on the respective roles of Congress and the Court ..... The Supreme Court’s decisions, at issue today, have produced a complex and daunting legal landscape, one that forces us to move forward carefully and within the proper constitutional framework.”
10.10 In the statement by Dickinson, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of United States Patent & Trademark Office, made before the Sub Committee on Courts and Intellectual Property, House of Representatives, on 27th July 2000, it was expressed that, “the post Florida Prepaid situation is clearly inequitable and provides a potential windfall for States at the expense of the America’s inventors, large and small. States benefit from an enormous collection of federally granted intellectual property rights, each and everyone of which is protected and enforced by Federal Courts”.He further stated that, if unaddressed, the Florida Prepaid decisions could make it more difficult for the United States to advocate strong intellectual property protection internationally. “When we criticize another country for having insufficient enforcement protection against patent, trademark and copyright infringers, that country may point out that we have no financial penalties at all with the infringers of a State university, a hospital or a government office. As a result, countries that have intellectual property laws that are weak or inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement could become increasingly resistent to American pressure to improve their laws.”
10.11 Mercifully, in the Indian context, the Supreme court has made it clear in Common Cause v. Union of India, reported in (1999)6 SCC 667 that the maxim that, “King can do no wrong” on the basis of which, Common Law rule that “Crown was not answerable for the torts committed by its servants” was generated, has not been applied here in this country. The government would also be liable for torts committed in exercise of sovereign powers except when the act complained of amounted to an “Act of State”. Traditional sovereign functions were, the making of laws, carrying on of war, making of treaties of peace and other consequential functions.
11. Extending Life of Unexpired Copyright
11.1 It will be noticed from the history of copyright legislation that the term of protection of copyright has been extended from time to time. Section 22 of the Copyright Act, 1957 of India provides for the term of copyright in published literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, which has been raised to 60 years from the beginning of the calender year next following the year in which the author dies, by Amendment Act No.13 of 1992, with effect from 28-12- 1991, in place of 50 years, which was earlier prescribed. Similar amendment was made in Section 23 dealing with the term of copyright in anonymous and pseudonymous works, raising the period from 50 years to 60 years as also in the other provisions prescribing the terms of copyright in photograph, cinematography film, sound recording etc. in Chapter V of the Act.
11.2 In the United States, the Congress enlarged the duration of copyright by 20 years, raising the period of 50 years to 70 years after the author’s death by enacting the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) - Title 17 U.S.C. Section 302 (a)). This amendment was challenged on the ground that it fails constitutional review under both Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” prescription and the First Amendments’ free speech guarantee, in Eldred v. John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General (No.01-618 decided on January 15, 2003). The petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that had gone into the public domain, had raised this challenge maintaining that the Congress went awry not with respect to newly created works, but in enlarging the term for published works with existing copyrights. The Court by majority held that, in placing existing and future copyright in parity in the Copyright Term Extension Act, the Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutional limitations. It was held that: “The CTEA,...does not oblige anyone to re-produce another’s speech against the carrier’s will. Instead, it protects authors’ original expression from unrestricted exploitation. Protection of that order does not raise the free speech concerns present when the government compels or burdens the communication of particular facts or ideas. The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make or decline to make one’s own speech, it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other peoples’ speeches”.
11.3 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, expressed the view that, “Ex post facto extensions of copyrights result in a gratuitous transfer of wealth from the public to authors, publishers and their successors in interest. Such retroactive extensions do not even arguably serve either of the purposes of the Copyright / Patent Clause. The reasons why such extensions of the patent monopoly are unconstitutional apply to copyrights as well”. In his dissent, Justice Breyer found that the statute lacks the constitutionally necessary rational support. (i) if the significant benefits that its bestows are private, not public; (ii) if it threatens seriously to undermine expressive values that the Copyright Clause embodies (i.e. US Constitution’s Copyright Clause, Art. I Clause 8(8) which grants Congress the power to “promote the progress of science... by securing for limited times to authors ... the exclusive right to their respective writings”). According to him, it was well established that copyright statutes must serve public not private, ends; that they must seek “to promote the progress” of knowledge and learning, and that, they must do so both by creating incentives for authors to produce and by removing the related restrictions on dissemination after expiration of a copyright’s “limited Time” - a time that (like “a limited monarch”) is “restrained” and “circumscribed”, “not left at large”. He observed that the potential users of such works include not only movie buffs and aging jazz fans, but also historians, scholars, teachers, writers, artists, database operators and researchers of all kinds those who want to make the past accessible for their own use or for that of others. The permissions requirement can inhibit their ability to accomplish that task. Moreover the older the work the less likely it retains commercial value, and the harder it will likely prove to find the current copyright holder. The older the work, the more likely it will prove useful to the historian, artist or teacher. The older the works the less likely it is that a sense of author’s rights can justify a copyright holder’s decision not to permit re-production, for the more likely it is that the copyright holder making the decision is not the work’s creator, but, say, a corporation or a great - grandchild whom the work’s creator never knew.” Justice Breyer was, therefore, of the view that this statute will cause serious expression related harm. It was likely to restrict traditional dissemination of copyright works, and inhibit new forms of dissemination through the use of new technology and threatened to interfere with efforts to preserve the Nation’s historical and cultural heritage and efforts to use that heritage.
11.4 In some quarters, it has been suggested that the copyright terms should be shortened, thereby increasing the size of the “public domain” available for creative manipulation. Copyright owners’ authority to control the preparation of “derivative works” should be reduced for the same reason. (Neil Netanel’s essay on “Copyright and Democratic Civil Society”, referred to by William Fisher in his Article : “Theories of Intellectual Property”. The latter article considers various theoretical writings on Intellectual Property and can be viewed on: www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/ tfisher/iptheory.html).
11.5 If the purpose of the copyright law is to provide incentive for creative intellectual efforts that will benefit the society at large an unduly prolonged protection of copyright would obviously block the benefits of the creative genius to the public. The society greatly contributes to an individual’s thinking at various levels of development of his personality and a creative genius therefore owes a duty to the society to release the fruits of his attainments for the general good.
12. Operation Fastlink
12.1 Intellectual property industries, from music to games, to summer blockbuster movies and software that families can use to track their finances or to help their children learn to read, play significant roles in the economy of a country. The intellectual property industries contribute a huge amount of money to the gross domestic product and provide jobs. However, such global economic growth is threatened by online thieves, who can, with a single keystroke distribute illegally millions of copies of stolen programmes and products. Well-organized criminal enterprises are increasing the scale, scope and sophistication of international online theft. (See Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft, released on April 22, 2004 by the U.S. Department of Justice).
12.2 The intellectual property enforcement is a priority for the Department of Justice and the Attorney General in March 2004, established the Intellectual Property Task Force with a view to strengthen and improve the efforts to combat theft of intellectual property. Intellectual property theft is a global threat and requires a global response that protects vigorously intellectual property rights and enforces consistently copyright laws. The Attorney General John Ashcroft announced on 22nd April 2004, the largest and most far-reaching and aggressive enforcement action ever undertaken against the criminal core of digital theft, including theft of movies, music, games, business and educational software on the Internet : “Operation Fastlink.” This was the most far-reaching and aggressive enforcement action ever undertaken against organizations involved in illegal intellectual property piracy over the Internet. Operation Fastlink was the culmination of four separate undercover investigations simultaneously being conducted by the FBI, coordinated by the FBI Cyber Division and the U.S. Department of Justice, coordinated by the Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) of the Criminal Division. As a result of “Fastlink” over 120 total searches were executed in the preceding 24 hours in 27 States and in 10 foreign countries. Foreign searches were conducted in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, The Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden as well as Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Operation Fastlink is described as the largest multinational law enforcement effort ever directed at online piracy. Nearly 100 individuals worldwide were identified by the investigation, many of whom are the leaders or high level members of various international piracy organizations. (See Press Release No.04-263 dated April 22, 2004 by Department of Justice “Operation Fastlink is the largest global enforcement action ever undertaken against online piracy”).
12.3 Operation Fastlink also resulted in the seizure of more than 200 computers including 30 computer servers that functioned as storage and distribution hubs. These servers collectively contained hundreds of thousands of copies of pirated works. One of the storage and distribution servers seized in the United States reportedly contained 65,000 separated pirated tiles.
12.4 The magnitude of the Internet piracy can be judged from the outcome of the enforcement action of Operation Fastlink and should be sufficient to alert the concerned departments and authorities to prompt them to initiate action on similar lines to detect and thwart criminal infringements of intellectual property rights.
13. Conclusion
13.1 In order to understand the complexities of the issues governing the ever expanding field of copyright law, there should be given an intensive training to those who participate in legislation and dispense justice so that the necessary legislative changes are duly identified and made and the laws correctly interpreted and enforced. The help of academicians who have specialized in the field can be sought in order to assist the legislative process that is required to be undertaken to fine-tune the copyright law to effectively cope up with computer software piracy, the alarming music piracy and other aspects discussed above. The Chief Co-ordinating Officer of the Indian Music Industry (IMI) - an association of music companies - recently lamented that though the number of seizures, raids and arrests is higher, the conviction rate is zero in one State. (News item in Times of India dated 5/6/04). The higher margin of profit in producing duplicate C.Ds. and MP3s has lured many to the piracy business and such piracy surely can be stopped by swift action, collection of the relevant evidence by the investigating agencies specialized in the field and by entrusting the trials to Judges well equipped with knowledge of relevant laws. A public awareness programme should be developed to educate the general public on the risks of using the Internet and other means to obtain infringing copies of the copyrighted works.
Registrar General
High Court of Gujarat.
Sola, Ahmedabad.
Pin Code : 380 060.
Gujarat, India.
Phone : +91 79 27664601-15
E-Mail : rg-hc-guj@nic.in
dear friends you can contact with gujarat high court by upon contact details..
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